Polygraph and Deception Tests: Part II by Giannelli, Paul C.
Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law Scholarly Commons 
Faculty Publications 
1985 
Polygraph and Deception Tests: Part II 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Case Western University School of Law, paul.giannelli@case.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Evidence Commons, and the Litigation Commons 
Repository Citation 
Giannelli, Paul C., "Polygraph and Deception Tests: Part II" (1985). Faculty Publications. 471. 
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/471 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. 
it. 
I i ::;·; '1 ~· ·' ' . 
Vol. 8, No.2 March-April 1985 
POLYGRAPH AND DECEPTION TESTS 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Professor of Law 
Case Western Reserve University 
This is the second of a two-part article on the poly-
graph, psychological stress evaluator, and truth serum. 
The Valdez conditions have been adopted by many 
of the courts that admit stipulated polygraph results. 
E.g., Wynn v. State, 423 So. 2d 294, 300 (Ala. Grim. 
App. 1982); State v. Souel, 53 Ohio St. 2d 123, 134, 
372 N.E.2d 1318, 1323 (1978). Several courts have 
altered the conditions in some respects. For example, 
an oral agreement in open court in lieu of a written 
agreement is recognized by some courts. Wynn v. 
State, 423 So. 2d 294, 299 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982); 
State v. Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570, 587 (Iowa 1980); State 
v. Roach, 223 Kan. 732,736, 576 P.2d 1082, 1086 
(1978). In addition, a warning that the defendant is 
waiving his right against self-incrimination is also re-
quired by other courts. Wynn v. State, 423 So. 2d 294, 
299 (Ala. Grim. App. 1982). 
The interpretation of the stipulation has raised a 
number of issues. E.g., Young v. State, 387 So. 2d 
512, 512-13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (experts in addi-
tion to examiner not permitted to testify because their 
testimony was not part of the stipulation); Porterfield v. 
State, 150 Ga. App. 303, 257 S.E.2d 372, 373 (1979) 
(testimony concerning inconclusive results not admissi-
ble because not part of the stipulation). These cases 
highlight the importance of drafting the stipulation with 
care. For example, an agreement to admit the results 
of a polygraph examination conducted by a compete!]t 
examiner does not encompass an examination by an · 
examiner who is not licensed under the applicable 
state statute. Holcomb v. State, 268 Ark. 138, 140, 594 
S.W.2d 22, 23 (1980); State v. Tavernier, 27 Or. App. 
115, 118, 555 P.2d 481, 482 (1976). An agreement to 
admit the results of an examination permits the pro-
secution to use the results in his case-in-chief in the 
absence of a statement limiting the results to im-
peachment. White v. State, 269 Ind. 479, 483-84, 381 
N.E.2d 481, 484-85 (1978); State v. Baskerville, 139 
N.J. Super. 389, 394, 354 A.2d 328, 330 (1976). 
Moreover, some courts have held that the agree-
ment must be strictly construed; thus, when the state 
Public Defender: Hyman Friedman 
failed to comply with a stipulation that required the 
defense attorney to review all questions, the results of 
the examination were inadmissible. Chambers v. State, 
146 Ga. App. 126, 128, 245 S.E.2d 467, 469 (1978). 
The argument for construing a stipulation strictly 
against the state is based on constitutional grounds: 
"Where an accused waives his constitutional right to 
remain silent in exchange for an agreement that his 
statements will not be used under certain conditions 
which are fulfilled, the bargain made by the State will 
be enforced." State v. Fuller, 387 So. 2d 1040, 1041-42 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). 
One other issue that has arisen in the stipulation 
cases deserves comment. In People v. Reeder, 129 
Cal. Rptr 646 (1976), the court held that a defense 
counsel "who, in advance of the examination, stipu-
lates that a defendant will submit to a polygraph ex-
amination and the results will be admissible at trial 
demonstrates incompetence." !d. at 648. This decision 
was subsequently vacated and the defendant's in-
competency claim rejected. People v. Reeder, 65 Cal. 
App. 3d 235, 135 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1976). Later cases 
have also rejected such claims. For example, in one 
case the court held that when counsel agrees to an 
examination after the defendant insists on his inno-
cence, there is no incompetence. People v. Berry, 118 
Cal. App. 3d 122, 134, 173 Cal. Rptr. 137, 143, cert. 
denied, 454 U.S. 966 (1981). See generally Annat., 9 
A.L.R.4th 354 (1981). 
Discretionary Admissibility 
A few trial courts have admitted polygraph evidence 
without a stipulation. E.g., United States v. Ridling, 
350 F. Supp. 90, 99 (E.D. Mich. 1972); People v. 
Daniels, 422 N.Y.S.2d 832, 837 (S. Ct. 1979); State v. 
Sims, 52 Ohio Misc. 31, 369 N.E.2d 24 (Ohio C.P. 
1977). 
Moreover, several appellate courts have recognized 
a trial court's discretion to admit polygraph evidence 
even in the absence of a stipulation. The Seventh Cir-
cuit has repeatedly taken this position: United States 
v. Feldman, 711 F.2d 758, 767 (7th Cir. 1983); United 
States v. Black, 684 F.2d 481, 484 (7th Cir.), cert. 
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denied, 103 S. Ct. 463 (1982); United States v. Rumell, 
642 F.2d 213, 215 (7th Cir; 1981) (citing other cases). 
The Ninth Circuit has adopted a similar position: 
United States v. Falsia, 724 F.2d 1339, 1341 (9th Cir. 
1983}; United St.ates v. Ferris, 719 F.2d 1405, 1408 (9th 
Cir. 1983}; United States v. Estrada-Lucas, 651 F.2d 
1261, 1264 (9th Cir. 1980}; United States v. Marshall, 
526 F.2d 1349, 1360 (9th Cir. 1975}, cert. denied, 426 
U.S. 923 (1976}. In most cases, however, trial courts 
have exercised this discretion by excluding polygraph 
evidence. 
Two jurisdictions, Massachusetts and New Mexico, 
have upheld the admissibility of polygraph evidence 
without stipulation. In Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 
365 Mass 421, 313 N.E.2d 120 (1974}, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts held polygraph evi-
dence admissible if the defendant agrees in advance 
to the admission of test results and the trial judge 
conducts a "close and searching inquiry" into the 
qualifications of the examiner, the methods employed 
in the examination, and the suitability of the defendant 
for testing. /d. at 426, 313 N.E.2d at 124. In subse-
quent cases, the court further defined the conditions 
under which unstipulated results may be admitted. 
First, if the defendant has already taken an examina-
tion, he must agree that the results of a new examina-
tion are admissible. Commonwealth v. Stewart, 375 
Mass. 380, 384, 377 N.E.2d 693, 697 (1978). Second, 
the results of the examination cannot be admitted as 
substantive evidence; they affect only the credibility of 
the defendant. Thus, the defendant must testify before 
the results are admissible. Commonwealth v. Vitello, 
376 Mass. 426, 450-52, 381 N.E.2d 582, 597-98 (1978}; 
accord Commonwealth v. Moynihan, 376 Mass. 468, 
478-79, 381 N.E.2d 575, 581 (1978}. Third, admissibility 
is restricted to the defendant; polygraph evidence con-
cerning a witness is not admissible. Commonwealth v. 
DiLego, 387 Mass. 394, 439 N.E.2d 807, 808 (1982). 
Finally, under some circumstances an indigent defen-
dant is entitled to an examination at state expense. 
Commonwealth v. Lockley, 381 Mass. 156, 160-61, 408 
N.E.2d 834, 838-39 (1980}. 
New Mexico has gone the furthest in admitting 
polygraph evidence. In State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M. 184, 
539 P.2d 204 (1975), the New Mexico Supreme Court 
held that polygraph results are admissible if (1} the 
operator was qualified, (2) the testing procedures were 
reliable, and (3) the test of the particular subject was 
valid. /d. at 184-85, 539 P.2d at 205. See also State v. 
Urioste, 94 N.M. 767, 700, 617 P.2d 156, 159 (1980) (er-
ror to preclude cross-examination of examiner con-
cerning chart and scoring); State v. Bell, 90 N.M. 134, 
138-39, 560 P.2d 925, 929-30 (1977) (inconclusive re-
sults are irrelevant and therefore inadmissible). 
Currently, New Mexico Evidence Rule 707 governs 
admissibility. This rule permits the admissibility of 
polygraph evidence in the discretion of the trial court 
under the following conditions. First, the examination 
must be conducted by a qualified examiner. Minimum 
qualifications include five years' experience adminis-
tering or interpreting polygraph examinations or 
equivalent academic training and at least twenty hours 
of continuing education during the twelve months prior 
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to the examination offered in evidence. N.M. Evid. R. 
707(b). Second, the examination must include at least 
two relevant questions, at least three charts, and be 
quantitatively scored. N.M. Evid. R. 707(c). Moreover, 
the pre-test interview and actual testing must be re-
corded in full on an audio or video recording device. 
N.M. Evid. R. 707(e). Third, the party intending to offer 
the evidence generally must provide ten-day written 
notice to the other party, including copies of the ex-
aminer's report, each chart, the audio or video record-
ing of the pre-test interview and actual testing, and a 
list of any prior examinations taken by the subject. 
N.M. Evid. R. 707(d). 
Constitutional Arguments 
Several constitutional arguments have been advanc-
ed to support the admissibility of polygraph evidence. 
See generally Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: 
An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal 
Trials, 9 Ind. L. Rev. 713, 810-15 (1976); Note, Com-
pulsory Process and Polygraph Evidence: Does 
Exclusion Violate a Criminal Defendant's Due Process 
Rights?, 12 Conn. L. Rev. 324 (1980); Note, Admission 
of Polygraph Results: A Due Process Perspective, 55 
Ind. L.J. 157 (1979); Note, State v. Dean, A Compulsory 
Process Analysis of the Inadmissibility of Polygraph 
Evidence, 1984 Wis. L. Rev. 237. 
The principal constitutional argument focuses on the 
defendant's right to present a defense. In State v. 
Dorsey, 87 N.M. 323, 532 P.2d 912, 914-15 (N.M. Ct. 
App.), aff'd on other grounds, 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 
204 (1975), a New Mexico appellate court reversed a 
trial court's exclusion of polygraph evidence on the 
grounds that a defendant has a due process right to 
present critical and reliable defense evidence. In 
Jackson v. Garrison 495 F. Supp. 9 (W.D.N.C. 1979), 
rev'd, 677 F.2d 371 (4th Cir. 1981), a federal district 
court held that the exclusion of polygraph evidence 
denied a defendant a fair trial. In State v. Sims, 52 
Ohio Misc. 31, 32, 369 N.E.2d 24, 46 (C.P. 1977), an 
Ohio trial court found an implied right to present 
defense evidence in the compulsory process 
guarantee, which, it concluded, compelled the admis-
sion of defense polygraph evidence. The precedential 
value of these cases, however, is not strong. Jackson 
was overruled on appeal, Jackson v. Garrison, 677 
F.2d 371 (4th Cir. 1981), Dorsey was affirmed but not 
on constitutional grounds, State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M. 
184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975), and Sims is inconsistent with 
later Ohio cases. Although the Ohio Supreme Court 
accepted the admission of stipulated polygraph results 
in State v. Souel, 53 Ohio St. 2d 123, 372 N.E.2d 1318 
(1978), it rejected the constitutional arguments for ad-
mission in State v. Levert, 58 Ohio St. 2d 213, 215, 
389 N.E.2d 848, 850 (1979). 
The right to present defense evidence also was 
cited in McMorris v. Israel, 643 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 
1981), in which the defendant offered to stipulate to 
the admission of a polygraph examination. Although 
stipulated polygraph results were admissible under 
state law at that time, the prosecutor, without offering 
any reasons, refused to stipulate. In granting habeas 
corpus relief, the Seventh Circuit wrote: "Where credi-
-~ 
bility is as critical as in the instant case, the circum-
stances are such as to make the polygraph evidence 
materially exculpatory within the meaning of the Con-
stitution." /d. at 462. The court, however, rested its 
decision on narrower grounds; that is, the prosecu-
tion's refusal to stipulate without offering a valid 
ground for the refusal deprived the defendant of due 
process: "From all that appears, [the prosecutor] was 
acting solely for tactical reasons in the belief that a 
test would not be helpful to his case. If the prosecutor 
refuses and states reasons, it then becomes the duty 
of the court to determine whether the reasons offered 
rise above the purely tactical considerations present in 
a given case." /d. at 466. 
The response to McMorris has been chilly. Justice 
Rehnquist characterized McMorris as a "dubious con-
stitutional holding." Israel v. McMorris, 455 U.S. 967, 
970 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). Some courts simply reject the argument 
that the prosecution is required to provide reasons for 
its refusal to stipulate. See Jones v. Weldon, 690 F.2d 
835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982). Other courts reject the 
broader proposition that there is a constitutional right 
to present polygraph evidence. See Bashor v. Risley, 
730 F.2d 1228, 1238 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Gordon, 688 F.2d 42, 44 (8th Cir. 1982); Milano v. Gar-
rison, 677 F.2d 374, 375 (4th Cir. 1981); Jackson v. 
Garrison, 677 F.2d 371, 373 (4th Cir. 1981); United 
States v. Glover, 596 F.2d 857, 867 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 860 (1979); Conner v. Auger, 595 F.2d 
407, 411 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 851 (1979); 
United States v. Bohr, 581 F.2d 1294, 1303 (8th Cir. 
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 958 (1978); People v. 
Williams, 333 N.W.2d 577, 580 (Mich App. 1983). 
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit itself has noted that 
McMorris applies only where a jurisdiction accepts 
stipulated polygraph results, United States v. Black, 
684 F.2d 481, 483 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 
463 (1982), and does not change the trial court's 
discretionary authority to exclude polygraph evidence. 
United States v. Feldman, 711 F.2d 758, 767 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 352 (1983); United States v. 
Lupo, 652 F.2d 723, 729 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 
457 u.s. 1135 (1982). 
Proceedings Other Than Trial 
Courts have admitted polygraph evidence at sup-
pression hearings, People v. Cutter, 12 Grim. L. Rep. 
2133 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 6, 1972), sentence hearings, 
State v. Jones, 110 Ariz. 546, 551,521 P.2d 978, 983, 
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1004 (1974); State v. Watson, 115 
N.J. Super. 213, 218, 278 A.2d 543, 546 (Hudson Cty. 
Ct. 1971), and hearings for new trials. State v. 
Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975, 982-83 (La. 1979); People v. 
Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 412-14, 255 N.W.2d 171, 
197-99 (1977); People v. Snell, 118 Mich. App. 750, 768, 
325 N.W.2d 563, 572 (1982); State v. Yodsnukis, 281 
N.W.2d 255, 259-60 (N.D. 1979); State v. Olmstead, 
261 N.W.2d 880, 886 (N.D.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 918 
(1978). See generally Note, People v. Barbara: The Ad-
~ missibility of Polygraph Test Results in Support of a 
Motion for New Trial, 1978 Det. C.L. Rev. 347; Note, 
Polygraph Examination Results Admissible in Post-
Conviction Hearings, 56 N.C.L. Rev. 380 (1978); 55 U. 
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Det. J. Urb. L. 155 (1977). 
Some of these courts have distinguished such pro-
ceedings from the trial itself. For example, the Michi-
gan Supreme Court has held polygraph evidence 
admissible on a motion for a new trial although the 
same evidence is inadmissible at trial. People v. Bar-
bara, 400 Mich. 352, 411-14, 255 N.W.2d 171, 197-98 
(1977). According to the court, polygraph results may 
be of some assistance to the trial judge in deciding 
issues that typically arise in proceedings to determine 
whether a new trial should be granted: "Traditionally, 
the testimony of recanting or suddenly discovered 
witnesses has been highly suspect, largely because it 
is impossible to determine when the truth is being 
told. The polygraph won't do this either; not even its 
most ardent proponents would so contend. But it 
might help." /d. at 415, 255 N.W.2d at 199. The court 
also commented that admissibility in this context 
would provide an "opportunity to test [the] effec-
tiveness of the polygraph .... " /d. 
RELATED ISSUES 
Fifth Amendment 
In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the 
U.S. Supreme Court indicated, albeit in dictum, that 
compelled submission to a polygraph test would vio-
late the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against com-
pelled self-incrimination: 
Some tests seemingly directed to obtain "physical 
evidence," for example, lie detector tests measuring 
changes in body function during interrogation, may ac-
tually be directed to eliciting responses which are essen-
tially testimonial. To compel a person to submit to testing 
in which an effort will be made to determine his guilt or 
innocence on the basis of physiological responses, 
whether willed or not, is to evoke the spirit and history of 
the Fifth Amendment. /d. at 764. 
The courts that have admitted polygraph evidence 
have recognized the applicability of the privilege in 
this context: "The polygraph results are essentially 
testimonial in nature and therefore a defendant could 
not be compelled initially to take such an examination 
on the Commonwealth's motion." Commonwealth v. A 
Juvenile, 365 Mass. 421, 431, 313 N.E.2d 120, 127 
(1974). The protection of the privilege would also ex-
tend to any comment on a defendant's refusal to sub-
mit to an examination. See Bowen v. Eyman, 324 F. 
Supp. 339, 341 (D. Ariz. 1970); MacDonald v. State, 
164 Ind. App. 285, 293-94, 328 N.E.2d 436, 441 (1975). 
The defendant, however, may waive the privilege. See 
United States v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 731, 734-36 (8th Cir. 
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 973 (1976); United States 
v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 97 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Com-
monwealth v. A Juvenile, 365 Mass. 421, 431-32, 313 
N.E.2d 120, 127 (1974). 
Confessions 
It is not uncommon for a defendant to make an in-
criminatory statement before, during, or after a poly-
graph examination has been administered. Since 
polygraph examinations involve testimonial evidence 
under the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, the admissibility of statements made 
during the examination process may be subject to the 
I 
Miranda warnings. Miranda warnings are required only 
if the defendant is in custody, Berkemer v. McCarty, 
104 S. Ct. 3138, 3145 {1984); California v. Beheler, 103 
S. Ct. 3517, 3519 (1983), and subjected to interroga-
tion. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 {1980). The 
defendant, however, may waive his right to remain 
silent and to counsel when he agrees to take a poly-
graph examination. See United States v. Iron Thunder, 
714 F.2d 765, 771-72 (8th Cir. 1983); Henry v. Dees, 
658 F.2d 406, 408 (5th Cir. 1981) (waiver invalid where 
examiner asked questions of a mentally retarded 
defendant that went beyond agreement to take 
examination). 
Even if the defendant initially asserts his right to 
counsel after receiving Miranda warnings, he may 
subsequently waive that right by initiating conversa-
tions with the police, including a request for a poly-
graph examination. See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 103 S. 
Ct. 2830 (1983). In Wyrick v. Fields, 103 S. Ct. 394 
(1982), the U.S. Supreme Court held that admissions 
made by a defendant during a post-test interview were 
admissible where the defendant, who was represented 
by counsel, requested a polygraph examination and 
was informed of his Miranda rights. The Court rejected 
the argument that new warnings were required prior to 
the post-test interview. However, not all statements that 
are made after an examination are necessarily ad-
missible; they are admissible only if the defendant 
voluntarily and knowingly waives his rights to remain 
silent and to counsel. See United States v. Gillyard, 
726 F.2d 1426, 1429-30 (9th Cir. 1984) (defendant did 
not validly waive right to a post-test interrogation by of-
ficers other than the examiner). 
In addition to Fifth Amendment Miranda rights, a 
defendant's admissions during a polygraph examina-
tion may be excluded if they are obtained in violation 
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, Fields v. 
Wyrick, 706 F.2d 879, 880-81 (8th Cir. 1983) (defendant 
waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel), or are 
involuntary under the due process clause. See gene-
rally Annot., 89 A.L.R.3d 230 (1979). Moreover, some 
courts have held that polygraph evidence is admissi-
ble for the limited purpose of showing the voluntari-
ness of a confession. See United States v. Kampiles, 
609 F.2d 1233, 1244-45 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 
446 U.S. 954 (1980); Annot. 92 A.L.R.3d 1317 (1979). 
Pretrial Agreements 
In a few reported cases prosecutors have gone 
beyond stipulating to the admissibility of test results 
and have agreed to the dismissal of charges on the 
condition that the defendant pass a polygraph ex-
amination. See generally Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 1280 
(1971). In some cases the defendant had no obliga-
tions under such an agreement other than to cooper-
ate in the examination. People v. Reagan, 395 Mich. 
306, 309, 235 N.W.2d 581, 583 (1975); State v. San-
chell, 191 Neb. 505, 509-10 216 N.W.2d 504, 507-08 
(1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975). In other 
cases the defendant either agreed to admit the test 
results, Butler v. State, 228 So. 2d 421, 424-25 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1969), or to enter a plea to a reduced 
charge in the event he failed the examination, State v. 
Davis, 188 So. 2d 24, 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966). 
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A determinative factor in the reported cases has 
been the existence of a statute requiring court ap-
proval for dismissals. When a trial court approved the 
dismissal or was cognizant of the agreement, appell-
ate courts have held the prosecutor bound by the 
agreement on public policy grounds. Butler v. State, 
228 So. 2d 421, 424 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); State v. 
Davis, 188 So. 2d 24, 28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); 
People v. Reagan, 395 Mich. 306, 318, 235 N.W.2d 
581, 587 (1975). According to these courts, the agree-
ment represents a "pledge of public faith - a promise 
made by state officials - and one that should not be 
lightly disregarded." State v. Davis, 188 So. 2d 24, 27 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966). On the other hand, when 
court approval was required but not obtained, prosecu-
tion has been permitted even though a defendant suc-
cessfully passed the examination. State v. Sanchell, 
191 Neb. 505, 510, 216 N.W. 2d 504, 508 (1974) cert. 
denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975). See also Snead v. State, 
415 So. 2d 887, 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (oral 
agreement with Sheriff who lacked authority to enter 
into such an agreement is not enforceable). 
Notwithstanding the Jack of court approval, enforce-
ment of such an agreement may be required on con-
stitutional grounds. In agreeing to take a polygraph ex-
amination, the defendant waives his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination and it seems ques-
tionable that the state could induce such a waiver by 
promising to dismiss the charges in the event the de-
fendant passes the examination and then renege on 
that promise after the defendant has waived his con-
stitutional rights. Ct. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 
257 (1971) (enforceability of plea bargain); see also 
Mabry v. Johnson, 104 S. Ct. 2543 (1984). 
STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS 
The admissibility of polygraph evidence is the sub-
ject of legislation in a few jurisdictions. The most im-
portant example is New Mexico Evidence Rule 707, 
which makes polygraph evidence admissible in the 
discretion of the trial court under certain conditions. 
Another example is section 351.1 of the California 
Evidence Code which makes polygraph results inad-
missible "unless all the parties stipulate to the admis-
sion of such results." Cal. Evid. Code§ 351.1 (West 
Supp. 1984). Finally, a Wisconsin statute recognizes a 
privilege for all "oral and written communications dur-
ing or any results of an examination using an honesty 
testing device .... " Wis. Stat. Ann. § 905.065 (West 
Supp. 1984-85). 
These provisions are the exceptions rather than the 
rule. The more common statutory treatment of the 
polygraph involves licensure statutes. The significance 
of these provisions relates to the establishment of 
minimum standards for licensing. Ala. Code § 
34-25-21 (Supp. 1984); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 71-2207 
(1979); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 493.566 (West 1981); Ga. 
Code Ann. § 43-36-6 (1984); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 111, § 
2412 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 329.030 (Baldwin 1984); Mich Comp. Laws Ann. § 
338.1710 (West 1976); Miss. Code Ann. § 73-29-13 
(1972); Mont. Code Ann. § 37-62-202 (1983); Nev. Rev. 
Stat. § 648A.130 (1983); N.D. Cent. Code §43-31-07 
(Supp. 1983}; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 59, § 1458 (West 
Supp. 1984-85}; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 
4413(29cc} § 8 (Vernon Supp. 1984}. See generally 
Annat., 32 A.L.R.3d 1324 (1970} (polygraph licensing 
statutes}. 
The statutes will presumably play a role in determin-
ing the qualifications of experts in those jurisdictions 
that admit polygraph evidence, either in the discretion 
of the trial court or by stipulation. See Holcomb v. 
State, 268 Ark. 138, 140, 594 S.W.2d 22, 23 (1980} 
(stipulation interpreted to require a licensed examiner}; 
State v. Tavernier, 27 Or. App. 115, 118, 555 P.2d 481, 
482 (1976) (same}. Typically, these statutes establish 
requirements relating to age, citizenship, character, 
and academic or investigative experience. Require-
ments governing polygraph schooling and internships 
are also common. In some jurisdictions the statute 
merely establishes an administrative agency which is 
responsible for the promulgation of rules governing 
polygraph examiners. E.g., Va. Code §§ 54-916 to 
54-922 (1982}. Moreover, some provisions go beyond 
establishing qualification standards and prescribe the 
types of testing procedures that must be used in ad- . 
ministering polygraph examinations. For example, the 
Nevada statute provides that only examinations con-
ducted with approved instruments using standard and 
widely accepted techniques and using at least two 
charts may be administered. Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 
648A.200, .230 & .250 (1983}. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS EVALUATOR 
Psychological Stress Evaluation (PSE}, which was 
developed in the early 1970s, is another technique us-
ed to detect deception. See generally L. Taylor, Scien-
tific Interrogation ch. 11 (1984}; Kenety, The Psychologi-
cal Stress Evaluator: The Theory, Validity and Legal 
Status of an Innovative "Lie Detector," 55 Ind. L.J. 349 
(1980}; Note, The Psychological Stress Evaluator: 
Yesterday's Dream - Tomorrow's Nightmare, 24 Clev. 
St. L. Rev. 299 (1975}; Note, The Psychological Stress 
Evaluator: A Recent Development in Lie Detector Tech-
nology, 7 U. Cal. Davis L. Rev. 332 (1974}. 
PSE is based on the theory that a person's voice 
changes when that person is being deceptive; that is, 
the emotional stress accompanying the deception will 
produce physiological responses that can be recorded 
and analyzed. In this respect, PSE is similar to the 
polygraph. PSE measures changes in frequency mod-
ulations of the voice (microtremors}, the inaudible 
component of the voice produced by muscles in 
speech production. As stress increases, frequency 
modulation decreases. In this respect, PSE differs 
from polygraphy because it measures only one physio-
logical response. 
The procedure used in PSE involves the audio 
recording of a person's voice and the transmitting of 
that recording into a voice stress evaluator. The 
evaluator receives the electronically transduced 
speech patterns, analyzes them, and registers the 
~ results on chart paper. The examiner then evaluates 
the chart for indications of stress (decreases in micro-
tremors} and then determines whether deception is 
present. 
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Although PSE might be considered a "voice lie 
detector," it differs from a polygraph in a number of 
respects. Unlike the polygraph, a person can be sub-
jected to PSE without being "hooked up" to the evalu-
ator, without knowledge that the test is being con-
ducted, and the evaluation is not limited to yes and no 
responses. More importantly, the validity of this type of 
examination is even more suspect than polygraphy. Al-
though some studies support the validity of PSE evi-
dence, independent studies of the technique have 
consistently challenged its validity. For example, in one 
study the PSE "failed to perform at a level better than 
chance expectancy .... " Timm, The Efficacy of the 
Psychological Stress Evaluator in Detecting Deception, 
11 J. Police Sci. & Ad. 62, 65 (1983}. In another study, 
the investigators concluded that "in no test of the 
present study was the PSE-criteria correspondence 
... or the differences between PSE evaluations and 
chance decisions and between correct and incorrect 
evaluations significant, as to support the claim for 
PSE validity as a detector of psychological stress." 
Nachson & Feldman, Vocal Indices of Psychological 
Stress: A Validation Study of the Psychological Stress 
Evaluator, 8 J. Police Sci. & Ad. 40, 50 (1980}. Another 
commentator concluded that "the promise of voice 
stress analysis in the lie detection field is not and may 
never be a reality. All of the reliable evidence now 
available shows that none of the voice stress devices 
is useful in detecting deception .... " Horvath, Detect-
ing Decepting: The Promise and Reality of Voice Stress 
Analysis, 27 J. Forensic Sci. 340, 349 (1982}. See also 
D. Lykken, supra, at 159 ("There is no scientifically 
credible evidence that the PSE ... can reliably 
measure difference in 'stress' as reflected in the 
human voice."}. 
A number of courts have considered the admissi-
bility of PSE evidence. The overwhelming majority of 
these courts have rejected such evidence. Some 
courts have held that PSE evidence has not achieved 
general acceptance in the scientific community and 
thus is inadmissible under the Frye test. Barrel of Fun., 
Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty, 739 F.2d 1028, 
1032 (5th Cir. 1984}; United States v. Traficant, 566 F. 
Supp. 1046, 1047 (N.D. Ohio 1983); United States v. 
Bothwell, 17 M.J. 684, 688 (A.C.M.R. 1983}; Smith v. 
State, 31 Md. App. 106, 119-20, 355 A.2d 527, 535 
(1976}. 
Others have simply concluded that PSE is not 
reliable. State v. Naas, 409 So. 2d 535, 548 (La. 1981}; 
State v. Thompson, 381 So. 2d 823, 824 (La. 1980}; 
State v. Schouest, 351 So.2d 462, 469 (La. 1977}; 
State v. Ochalla, 285 N.W.2d 683, 684 (Minn. 1979); 
State v. Milano, 297 N.C. 485, 500, 256 S.E.2d 154, 
163 (1979}; Caldwell v. State, 267 Ark. 1053, 1060, 594 
S.W.2d 24, 28 (1980}; People v. Tarsi a, 50 N .Y.2d 1, 
405 N.E.2d 188, 191, 427 N.Y.S.2d 944, 946 (1980}; 
State v. Makerson, 52 N.C. App. 149, 153, 277 S.E.2d 
869, 872 (1981); ct. Heisse v. Vermont, 519 F. Supp. 36, 
46 (D. Vt. 1980} (statute limiting licenses to polygraph 
examiners is rationally based on its wider acceptance 
of reliability}. 
In contrast to the majority rule, the New Mexico 
Supreme Court has ruled PSE evidence admissible in 
the discretion of the trial court provided the offering 
party introduces evidence concerning (1) the qualifica-
tions and expertis~ of the examiner, (2) the reliability 
of the testing procedure employed as approved by au-
thorities in the field, and (3) the validity of the test 
made in the particular case. Simon Neustadt Family 
Center, Inc. v. Bludworth, 97 N.M. 500, 504, 641 P.2d 
531, 535 (1982). Thus, the New Mexico Supreme Court 
has adopted the same liberal approach to the admissi-
bility of PSE evidence that it had previously embraced 
with polygraph evidence. 
TRUTH SERUM 
So-called ''truth serums" involve the use of drugs, 
such as scopolamine, sodium amytal, sodium pento-
thal, and brevital sodium, that are central nervous sys-
tem depressants. See generally L. Taylor, Scientific In-
vestigation ch. 10 (1984); Dession, Freedman, Donnel-
ly & Redlich, Drug-Induced Revelation and Criminal In-
vestigation, 62 Yale L.J. 315 (1952); Polen, The Admis-
sibility of Ti'uth Serum Tests in the Courts, 35 Temp. 
L.Q. 401 (1962); Note, An Analysis of the Limited Legal 
Value of Ti'uth Serum, 11 Syracuse L. Rev. 64 (1959). 
These drugs temporarily alter the subject's psy-
chological state in such a way as "to induce a relaxed 
state of mind in which the suspect becomes more 
talkative and has less emotional control." MacDonald, 
Ti'uth Serum, 46 J. Crim. L., Criminology & Police Sci. 
259 (1955). The efficacy of "truth serums" as a 
method of lie detection has been viewed with skep-
ticism by many commentators: 
[E]xperimental and clinical findings indicate that only in-
dividuals who have conscious and unconscious reasons 
for doing so are inclined to confess and yield to interroga-
tion under drug influence. On the other hand, some are 
able to withhold information and some, especially charac-
ter neurotics, are able to lie. Others are so suggestible 
they will describe, in response to suggestive questioning, 
behavior which never in fact occurred. Notwithstanding 
these limitations, a drug-induced interview may be a valu-
able adjunct to an otherwise thorough psychiatric exami-
nation. In some instances it may enable a psychiatrist to 
ascertain more quickly the depth and type of mental ill-
ness. But drugs are not "truth sera." They lessen inhibi-
tions to verbalization and stimulate unrepressed expres-
sion not only of fact but of fancy and suggestion as well. 
Thus the material produced is not "truth" in the sense 
that it conforms to empirical fact. Dession, Freedman, 
Donnelly & Redlich, supra, at 319. 
The courts have uniformly rejected the admissibility 
of statements made by a person while under the in-
fluence of "truth serum" drugs when those statements 
are offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
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E.g., Lindsey v. United States, 237 F.2d 893, 895-96 
(9th Cir. 1956); Fetters v. State, 436 A.2d 796, 800 (Del 
1981); Zeigler v. State, 402 So. 2d 365, 373 (Fla. 1981), 
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1035 (1982); State v. Linn, 93 
Idaho 430, 433, 462 P.2d 729, 732 (1969); State v. 
Adams, 218 Kan. 495, 580, 545 P.2d 1134, 1144 (1976); 
Reed v. State, 644 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1983); Cain v. State, 549 S.W.2d 707, 712 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1977). See generally 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence§ 
998 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) (listing cases); Annat., 41 
. A.L.R.3d 1369 (1972). 
This rule of exclusion also extends to the testimony 
of experts that a defendant was telling the truth while 
under the influence of such drugs. E.g., Harper v. 
State, 249 Ga. 519, 526, 292 S.E.2d 389, 396 (1982); 
People v. Cox, 85 Mich. App. 314, 317, 271 N.W.2d 
216, 218 (1978); Merritt v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 
727, 729-30 (Ky. 1965). A different evidentiary issue is 
involved when an expert offers an opinion about a 
subject's mental state based on an examination that 
included the use of "truth serum" drugs. Some courts 
permit expert testimony in this situation. See People v. 
Cartier, 51 Cal. 2d 590, 601, 335 P.2d 114, 122 (1959); 
State v. White, 60 Wash. 2d 551, 374 P.2d 942, 950-53 
(1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 883 (1963). But see Peo-
ple v. Ford, 304 N.Y. 679, 681-82, 107 N.E.2d 595, 
596-97 (1952). 
Finally, the use of "truth serum" drugs to induce a 
confession is challengeable on due process grounds. 
As the U.S. Supreme Court has remarked: "It is dif-
ficult to imagine a situation in which a confession 
would be less the product of a free intellect, less 
voluntary, than when brought about by a drug having 
the effect of a 'truth serum.' " Townsend v. Sain, 372 
U.S. 293, 307-08 (1963); see also People v. Johnson, 
32 Cal. App. 3d 988, 1002 109 Cal. Rptr. 118, 127 
(1973). 
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